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Land  diversion  and  supply  control  programs  have  become  a  sig-
nificant  part  of  the  agricultural  establishment  in  recent  years.  They
have  been  highly  controversial,  and  the  advantages  and  disadvan-
tages  of the  programs  have  been  well  documented.  Proponents  argue
that  the  programs  have  removed  the  great  instability  in  farm  prices
and  incomes,  have  provided  a  strategic  reserve  of production  capac-
ity  to  meet  unpredictable  emergencies  such  as  wars  and  drouths,
have  provided  an  orderly  outmovement  of  surplus  farm  labor,  and
have  conserved  farm  resources  for  future  generations.
Opponents  argue that  the programs have  cost  taxpayers  too much
money,  have  benefited  only  large  producers,  have  regressively  dis-
tributed income  from  taxpayers  of modest means to prosperous farm-
ers, have diverted public attention and support from the real problems
of  rural  poverty,  have  interfered  with  freedom  of  farmers  to  produce
and market  as  they please,  have  lost their  effectiveness  through  cap-
italization  of benefits  into  land  or  through  slippage  (bringing  in  new
cropland,  using  more  fertilizer,  etc.),  have  interfered  with  commer-
cial  exports  of  farm  products,  and  have  caused  inefficiency  through
freezing  of  production  patterns  and  idling  of  land  resources  which
have  little  value  for anything  but agricultural  uses.
A  number  of  suggestions  to  improve  farm  programs  cover  well-
plowed  grounds.  It  has  been  suggested  that  allotments  be  made  ne-
gotiable,  that  acreage  allotments  be  shifted  to  bushel  or  poundage
quotas,  that  "normal"  yields  be  set  once  and  for  all  so  farmers  are
not encouraged  to  expand yields  to  get more payments,  that  a farmer
not  be  allowed  to  move  allotments  from  a poor  farm  which  he pur-
chases to  the  good land  on his  "home"  farm,  that the  farmer actually
receive  the  market  price  for  his  marginal production  (rather  than  a
blend  price)  to  constrain  output  expansion  in  a  two-price  or  direct
payment  (grant)  program,  that  long-term  land  retirement  be  ex-
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130panded  to remove  marginal land from  production and  to reduce  gov-
ernment  costs,  that  program  administration  be  streamlined  at  the
local  level,  that payments  be  cut  off  or graduated  for  large  farmers,
and that  program  formulation  be placed  in  the  hands  of an  Agricul-
tural  Board  patterned  after  the Federal  Reserve  Board.
Many  of these changes  in programs  have much merit, but chances
for  any  major  shift  in  commercial  farm  policies  seem  remote.  A  re-
view  of  history  suggests  that  crisis  is  the  major  impetus  for  major
policy  adjustments.  The  crisis  took  the  form  of  extremely  low  farm
income  in  the  1930's,  war  in  the  1940's,  large  surpluses  in the  late
1950's,  and  farm  revolt  against  mandatory  programs  in  the  early
1960's.
Factors  that  could  cause  major  changes  in  farm  programs  in  the
1970's  include  a major shift  in  the world  supply-demand  balance for
food,  unwillingness  of  farmers  to  accept  current  type  programs,  or
serious  erosion  of  farm  political  strength.  Recent  legislative  action
indicates  that  farm  programs  still  have  sizable  support  in  Congress.
This  paper  focuses  on  the  two other  potential  crisis  issues:  (1)  the
world  food  supply-demand  balance  and  its  implications  for  U.S.
agricultural  programs  and  (2)  the  acceptance  of current  feed  grains-
wheat  programs.
Farm  economic  problems  and  the  consequent  call  for  govern-
ment  programs  have  been  explained  by  asset  fixity,  rapid  improve-
ment  in  technology,  and  an  unfavorable  trend  in  the  world  food
supply-demand  balance.  Yet  the  farm  economy  has  been  depressed
for  an  extended  period-a  period  long  enough  to  overcome  most
asset  fixity.  Furthermore,  demand  has  expanded  faster  than  supply
in  recent  years.  Productivity  of  farm  resources  was  only  5 percent
higher  in  1967  than  in  1958,  and  was  the  same  in  1967  as  in  1963
(USDA,  June  1968).  This slowdown  in  productivity  gains,  plus new
sources  of  off-farm  income  for  farmers  resulted  in  an  average  net
income  per farm  of $9,000  in  1966  and  1967;  and farms  with  gross
farm  product  sales  of  only  $2,500  to  $4,999  had  net  incomes  aver-
aging  over  $6,000  in  the  two  years  from  all  sources.  Yet  farmers
seem  to  be more  concerned  than ever  about  economic  conditions.
The  favorable  net  income  data  quoted  above  do  not  include  a
charge  for  equity  capital,  and  for  operator  and  family  labor.  When
the  latter  are  included  at  opportunity  levels  in  farm  costs,  then  re-
ceipts do  not cover  all farm production  costs.  This problem,  reflected
in  low returns  on farm  resources,  is not  really  helped by government
programs  and  will  remain  a  persistent  problem,  whatever  the  parity
ratio,  until the structure  of  farming changes  markedly.
131INCREASING  RETURNS  TO  FARM  SIZE
Numerous  studies have documented  decreasing  average  costs  and
increasing  returns  to size  of farm firms.  But the  concept has not been
related  to  farm  problems.  Expansion  in  the  farm  firm  is  generally
characterized  by  increases  in  the  proportion  of capital  to  labor,  and
of variable  capital  to  fixed  capital.  These  changes  result  in  a  sizable
reduction  in  the  cost  per  unit  of  production.
Evidence  of decreasing  cost  per unit  (increasing  returns  to  size)
is  readily  apparent  in  Table  1. In  1960,  the  cost  of  all  inputs  (in-
cluding  the  opportunity  cost  of  equity  capital  and  of  operator  and
family  labor)  per unit  of  output  (including  receipts  from  farm  com-
modities,  nonmoney  income,  and  government  payments)  averaged
$2.67  on  Class  VI  farms  and  $0.91  on  Class  I  farms.  Most of  the
economies  of  size  appear  to  be  achieved  by  Class  II farms,  and unit
costs  decline  very  slowly  beyond  an  annual  output  of  $30,000  per
farm.  Farms  with  sales  under  $25,000  on  the  average  lost  money
and did not cover  all production  costs in  1960.  Farms with  sales over
$25,000  received  an  economic  rent  per  unit  of  output.
It  may  be  said  that  small  farms  lost  money  because  they  paid
too  much  for  their  land.  Land  tends  to  be  a  complementary  input
with  farm  size.  There  is  constant  pressure  to expand  farm  acreage  to
achieve  the  economies  of size.  The  savings  through  greater efficiency
are  bid  into  the  price  of  land.  The  actual  price  of  land  tends  to  be
that  price  which  will  make  all  costs,  including  real  estate  interest,
equal  to the  value  of  all farm  receipts  on an economic size unit.
Competition  in  the  land  market  tends  to  bid  the  land  price  to
the  point  where  the  return  on  land  will  be  equal  to  the  return  on
capital in  other  uses.  A  potential  buyer  who  is  unwilling  to  pay  this
price  will  find  land  bid  away  from  him  by  the  investor  who  wishes
to maximize  returns.  And  investors  will not pay  more than  this price
because  a  greater  return  can  be  achieved  on  nonland  investments.
The residual  return  to  land  is  greatest  on  large,  efficient  farms.  The
law  of  one  price  and  the  large potential  number  of  investors  will  en-
sure  that  the  "high"  price  for  land  on  efficient  farms  will  be  the
market  price of land  applicable  to  all farms.
The  small  farmer  must  pay  this  price  or  land  will  be  bid  away
from  him  by  an  investor  who  has  or  can  achieve  an  economic  size
unit.  Thus  the  inefficient  small  farmer  actually  tends  to  incur  losses
if  he pays  the  current  land  price.  And  the  small  farmer who  has  full
equity  in land  is  losing money  if  a  charge is  made for the opportunity
cost  of his owned land valued  at  the current price  of farm  real estate.
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133In  1960  land  was  not  overpriced at  the  margin  because  large
farmers  were  earning  returns  greater  than needed  to  hold  capital  in
farming.  But  land was  clearly  overpriced  for the  average  farmer who
had  gross  sales  under  $25,000.
Class  I  farms  require  a  substantial  input  of  feed  and  livestock
provided  by  other farms.  Their  structure  is  atypical,  and if  all  farms
were  organized  in  this  manner,  there  would  not  be  sufficient  inter-
mediate  farm  inputs.  Hence  Class  II farms  provide  a more  meaning-
ful  measure  of the  potential  gain  in  efficiency  obtainable  by  a  more
nearly  optimum  farm  size  and  combination  of  inputs.  If  all  farms
were  organized  as  Class  II farms,  the  actual  1960  total input  would
have  produced  an  output  of  $44.9  billion,  or 24  percent  above  the
actual  level.  If  all  farms  had  been  organized  as  those  in  Class  II,
only  1.2  million  farms  could  have  produced  the  1960  output  with
$34.5  billion  of  inputs-19  percent  less  inputs  than  the actual  total
1960  inputs  of  $42.8  billion.  Even  discounting  the  crudity  of  the
approach,  the  results  clearly  point  to  large  potential  efficiency  from
reorganization  of farms  into  more  nearly  economic  units.
Because  most  size  economies  were  achieved  by  Class II  farms  in
1960,  there  would  have  been  few  economic  advantages  in  having  a
system  of  superfarms  that  would  have  reduced  the  number  of  farms
much  below  1.2  million.  This  conclusion  applies  only  to  1960  con-
ditions.  In  the  future  the  unit  costs  will  be  reduced,  decreasing  the
number  of farms  compatible  with  maximum production  efficiency.
The  heterogeneous  size  structure  of  farms  helps  to  explain  why
land  is  overpriced for most  farmers  and  why returns  are low  on farm
resources  of  most  farmers.  It  also  is  a  partial  explanation  of  why
farm  product  prices  tend  to  be  low.  The  continued  trend  toward
larger  farms,  apparent  in  the  1960  and  1965  distribution  of  inputs
in  Table  1, increases  farm  output.  Based  on the distribution  for these
two years  and the output-input  ratio  by class  of farm in 1960,  output
would  increase  6  percent,  or  1.2  percent  annually  from  1960  to
1965,  due  to  the  change  in  size distribution  with  the  same  total  vol-
ume  of  farm  resources  as  applied  in  1960.  Other  things  equal,  this
depresses  total  revenue  as  supply  presses  demand,  and  creates  new
pressures  for  farms  to  expand  in  size.  Farmers  are  on  a  treadmill
when  they  increase  size  and  output  because  this,  in  turn,  results  in
lower  prices  which  creates  the  need  for even  more  adjustments.
The  decreasing  cost  theory  is  especially  instructive  in  pointing
out  the  permanency  of  the  problem  of  low  returns.  An  increase  in
the  product  price  results  in  a  larger  residual  return  to  land.  The
higher  land  return  causes  land  prices to  rise  to  the point  where  farm
134and  nonfarm  investors  can  realize  a "parity"  return  on  their  invest-
ment.  This  land  price  is  determined  at  the margin  for  adequate  size
units.  It  follows  that  small  farms  will  on  the  average  receive  a  low
return  on  all  resources  valued  at  their  opportunity  costs  even  with
higher  farm  product  prices generated  by  supply control  programs.
The  decreasing  cost  theory  of  farm  problems  is  related  to  tech-
nology  and  fixed  resources.  The  ability  to  expand farm  size  is  linked
to  the  ability  of  farmers  to  purchase  more  land.  And the  ability  to
buy  land  and  consolidate  farms  is  linked  to  the  rate  at  which  a
neighbor  can  find  employment  outside  of  agriculture.  To  the extent
that  education  is  inadequate  to  equip  farm  people  for  the  exodus,
that  low-income  farmers  are  uninformed  or  prefer farming  as  a  way
of  life,  and  that  labor  unions  and  high  national  unemployment  in-
hibit  mobility,  the  process  of  adjustment  to  economic  farming  units
is  retarded.  Technology,  reflected  in  farm  machinery  and farm  man-
agement,  is  continually  changing.  Public  policy  geared  to  preserve
small  family  farms  is  likely  to  perpetuate  the  large  number  of  in-
efficient  farms.  In  1960,  only  about  10  percent  of  all  farms  had  an
annual  output  above  $25,000.  Public  policy  must be  concerned  with
getting  more  of the  remaining 90 percent  of farms into  that category.
Farmers  will not get off the output-increasing,  revenue-reducing,  low-
returns  treadmill  until  this  goal  has  been  achieved.  The  analysis
clearly  demonstrates  that  government  programs  do  not  raise  the  net
income  to  farm  labor  over  extended  periods  (unless  controls  and
transfer payments  are  accelerated),  but the  real contribution  of  pro-
grams  is  to  reduce variation  in farm  prices  and incomes.
FUTURE  SUPPLY-DEMAND  BALANCE
While  the  foregoing  analysis  shows  that land  diversion  and  sup-
ply  control  programs  do not  alleviate  the  problem  of  low returns  to
farm  resources,  these  programs  can  prevent  traumatic  problems  of
adjustment to lower gross incomes  as supply presses demand. Whether
control programs  will be needed  depends  strongly on the future trend
in  supply and  demand  for farm  commodities.
Can  American  Farmers  Feed the  World?
The  phrase,  "American  farmers  cannot  feed  the  world,"  has  be-
come  trite.  Some simple calculations  can  check  the conventional  wis-
dom  expressed  in  this phrase.  The  estimates  that  follow  are  in terms
of  corn,  but  could  also  be  made  for  substitutes  such  as  wheat,  po-
tatoes,  and  other  grains,  pulses,  and  vegetables.  Corn  will  provide
800-1,200  calories  per  pound.  The  minimum  daily  caloric  require-
ments  per  capita  can  be  met  with  three  pounds  of  corn-equivalent
135per  day.  With  3.5  billion  people  in  the  world,  10.5  billion pounds
of  corn-equivalent  are  required  per  day,  or  3,832.5  billion  pounds
per  year.
An  estimated  638  million  acres  are  suitable  for  continuous  culti-
vation  in  the  U.S.  and  another  169  million  acres  are  suitable  for
intermittent  cultivation  according  to  a  recent  report  of  the  National
Advisory  Commission  on  Food  and  Fiber.  If  the  latter  acres  are
suitable  for  cultivation  one  in  three  years,  then  total  cultivatable
cropland  in  the  U.S.  is  700  million  acres.  A  yield  of  5,474  pounds
(98  bushels)  of  corn  per  acre  on  700  million  acres  would  provide
minimum  caloric  requirements  for  3.5  billion  people.  This  average
yield  could  assuredly  be  attained  using  current  technology  with  a
major  investment  in  fertilizer  and  irrigation.  This  production  could
also  take  place  on  350  million  acres  yielding  196  bushels  per  acre.
The  U.S.  clearly  has  the  production  capability  to  "feed  the  world"
all  by  itself.  Of  course,  protein  supplements  in  the  form  of  beans,
fish  meal,  and  petroleum-based  synthetics  would  be  required  for  an
adequate  diet.
The  above  example  shows  that  the  U.S.  has  a  huge  food  pro-
duction  potential  and  the  physical  capability  to  feed  the  world.  It
would  require  an  austere  diet  on  the  part  of  Americans.  Meat,  of
course,  would  be  excluded,  and  the  diet  would  represent  a  consider-
able  sacrifice  from  current  standards.  While  the  issue  of whether  the
U.S.  can  produce  enough  to  feed  the  world  is  academic,  the  real
issue  is  the  extent  to  which  Americans  will  find  it  expedient  or  de-
sirable  to  supply food  aid.  What  sacrifices  are  Americans  willing  to
make,  and  how  much  food  aid  is  beneficial  to  other  countries?  The
answer  to  such  questions  lies  in  economic,  social,  and  political  fac-
tors  which  cannot  be  predicted  with  great  reliability.  Yet  projection
of  past  trends  gives  some  insight  into  what  can  be  expected  in  the
future.
Projection  of  the  Future  World  Food  Balance
A  1967  study  by  the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture  considers
future  prospects  for  world  grain  production  and  use  up  to  1980.
Measuring  world  food  demand  and  potential  supplies  in  terms  of
grains,  it  makes  projections  for  the  world  food  balance  to  1970  and
1980  under various  assumptions  about  the  rate  of economic  growth
in  the  food-deficit  countries.  The  study  relates  demand  to  the  rate
of  economic  growth  and  population  growth.  Thus  the  projections
show  the  effective  food  demands  rather  than  food needs.  The  study
deals  only  with  grains.  But  since  most  food  comes  directly  or  in-
directly  from  grains,  the  trends  in  grain  production  and  consump-
136tion  are  a  good  indicator  of  trends  in  the  world  food  situation  as  a
whole.
The  developing  countries  exhibit  declining  ability  to  feed  them-
selves.  But  the  ability  of  developed  countries  to  feed  themselves  is
increasing  and more  than compensates  for  any  gap that  emerges  be-
tween  production  and  food  needs  in developing  countries.  Thus  the
world  in  total  is  becoming  better  able  to feed  itself.
The projections  by  Abel and  Rojko1 showed  a  sizable  surplus  of
production  over  effective  demand.  We  balanced  the  world  food
budget  by  assuming  the  U.S.  to  be  a residual  supplier  of grains.  The
resulting  U.S.  share  of  shipments  from  the  major  exporting  coun-
tries  is in  line with past shares; hence,  the method  of balancing  seems
plausible.
This procedure  was  used  to  project  U.S.  grain  production,  acre-
age,  and  exports  for  1970  and  1980.  The  results  are  summarized  in
Table  2.  U.S.  grain  yields  are  projected  to  increase  2.4  percent  an-
nually  between  1966  and  1980.
TABLE  2.  U.S.  GRAIN  PRODUCTION,  ACREAGE,  AND  EXPORTS  PROJECTED  TO
1970  AND  19801
Actual
1966  1970  1980
Grain production  (million  metric  tons)  183.2  210.1  276.1
Acreage  harvested  (million  acres)  150.9  152.9  163.0
Exports  (million  metric  tons)  40.1  47.8  70.6
U.S.  share  of  world  exports  (percent)  47.72  48.2  52.1
Acreage  diversion  (million  acres)  60.4  55.0  47.0
'Calculations  based  on  data  from  Abel  and  Rojko,  1967.
2Estimate  for  1964.
According  to Table  2, the harvested  U.S.  grain acreage  will need
to  be  around  153  million  acres  in  1970  and  163  million  acres  in
1980,  compared with  151  million  acres  in  1966.  This represents  no
challenge  to  the  U.S.  productive  capacity-185  million  acres  were
harvested in  1959  and acreage  had been  even larger  in  earlier years.
By  shifting grassland,  cotton land,  and other land  to  feed  grains,  the
U.S.  could  easily have  200  million  acres  of grains.
Grains  currently  account  for  half  of  the  harvested  cropland  in
the U.S.  If other crops maintain  their current  supply-demand  balance
to  1980,  and  commodity  programs  similar  to  current  ones  are  used
1Martin  E.  Abel  and  Anthony  S.  Rojko,  World  Food Situation: Prospects for
World Grain Production, Consumption, and Trade, U.S.  Department  of Agriculture,
Foreign  Agricultural  Economic  Report  35,  1967.
137in  1980,  then  the  acreage  diversion  projected  for  1980  ranges  from
42  to 61  million  acres  with  a most likely estimate  of 47  million  acres.
This  compares  with  60  million  acres  in  1966.
Data  in  Table  2  can  be  used  as  a basis  for  predicting  total  de-
mand  for  food  and  fiber  in  the  U.S.  It  is  recognized  that  domestic
demand  for the  output of all U.S.  farms can be predicted  with greater
reliability  than  export  demand.  If  the  domestic  income  elasticity  of
demand  for farm  products  is  0.1,  per  capita income  increases  2  per-
cent  annually,  and  population  increases  1.4  percent  annually,  then
total domestic  demand  increases  at  the  rate  of  1.4  +  (0.1)2  =  1.6
percent  per year.  If  demand  for  exports  other  than  grains  increases
at  the  same  rate  as  grains,  about  4.1  percent  annually  based  on  the
estimates  in Table  2,  and  if  exports  constitute  18  percent  of  the  de-
mand  for  U.S.  farm  output,  then  total  demand  for  U.S.  farm  prod-
ucts  will  increase  0.82(1.6)  +  0.18(4.1)  =  2.0  percent  annually
(the  first  term  on  the  left  is  the  domestic  share,  the  second  term  the
export  share).
The  average  annual  increment  in  productivity  of farm  resources
from  1957  to  1967  was  1.2  percent.  If  this  holds  until  1980,  farm
production  resources  would  need  to  increase  2.0  - 1.2  =  0.8  per-
cent  annually  to  meet  the  growing  demand.  Farm  resources  have
increased  at  about  this  rate  since  1957.  The  conclusion  is  that  farm
resources  will  not  be  under  stress  to  meet  domestic  and world  needs
in  the  foreseeable  future.  The  most  reasonable  estimate,  that  farm
production  inputs  will  need  to  increase  only  0.8  percent  annually,
could  be  revised  upward  substantially  and  still  represent  no  great
challenge  to  agriculture.
If  productivity  does  not  increase  at  the  indicated  rate  through
increased  specialization,  consolidation,  and  expansion  of  farm  size,
and  the  introduction  of improved  inputs,  then  the  slack  will  have  to
be filled  with  more  conventional  inputs.  Nevertheless,  it is quite  clear
that  U.S.  farmers  can  meet  any  foreseeable  contingency  that  arises,
and  excess  production  capacity  is  likely  to  exist  by  1980  under  a
considerable  range  of  possible  circumstances.
PROGRAM  PREFERENCES  OF  FARMERS
Programs  to stabilize  farm income must be  acceptable  to farmers.
A  1968  survey  in  Oklahoma was  designed  to determine  what volun-
tary  programs  (land  purchase,  easements,  long-  or  short-term  land
retirement,  etc.)  would  remove  the  most  production  per government
dollar spent  on the program,  hence make  taxpayer  dollars  go  farthest
to  raise  farm  income.  These  results  are  now  being  summarized.  An-
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for  wheat  and  feed  grains  should  accomplish  and  the  acceptability
of  a  number  of  possible  programs.  The  results  are  summarized  in
Tables  3  and  4  for  a random  sample  of of  152 farms  in  three  west-
ern  Oklahoma  counties:  Grant,  Harper,  and  Tillman.  The  results  in
Table  3  are  also  compared  with  estimates  from  a  1964  survey  of
500  farmers  in  Oklahoma  and  Kansas.
TABLE  3.  PERCENTAGE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  FARMERS'  OPINIONS  OF  WHAT  A
WHEAT  AND  FEED  GRAIN  PROGRAM  SHOULD  ACCOMPLISH
1
Objective  Year  Agree  Undecided  Disagree
1.  Keep farmer's  cost of producing  1968  72  9  19
wheat  and  feed  grains low  1964  62  18  20
2.  Keep  wheat  and  feed  grain  1968  82  8  10
prices  at  parity  1964  91  5  4
3.  Keep  bread  and  meat  prices  1968  26  24  50
low  1964  29  28  42
4.  Assure  wheat  and  feed  grain  1968  81  7  12
producers  parity  income  1964  81  11  8
5.  Give  farmers  freedom  to
produce  and  market  as  much  1968  31  14  55
as  they wish  1964  55  14  31
6.  Keep  the  government  cost  1968  62  16  22
of  programs  low  1964  80  11  9
1Data  from  1968  survey  of  152  Oklahoma  farmers  and  1964  survey  of  500
Oklahoma  and  Kansas  farmers.  Some  of  the  152  farmers  were  surveyed  in  the  fall
of  1967.  The  objectives  were  confined  to  wheat  in  1964.
Objectives  of  Farm Programs
Farm  economic  conditions,  rather  than  efficiency,  low  govern-
ment  cost,  or low consumer food  cost,  received  the strongest  support
for  what  a  farm  program  should  accomplish.  The  focus  is  about
equally  strong  on parity  prices  and on  parity  income.  However,  the
focus  on  parity  prices  appears  to  be  less  intense  than  in  1964.  The
runner-up  preference  in  1964,  giving  farmers  freedom  to  produce
and  market  without  government  regulations,  was  rated  as  the  most
important  objective  of farm  programs  by only  one-tenth  of  all  farm-
ers.  The  introduction  of  a  voluntary  program  for  wheat  in  1964
may  have  reduced  the  prominence  of  the  objective  of  freedom  in
production  and  marketing.  It  is  of  interest  that  the  percentages  of
agreement-disagreement  on  the  freedom  objective  were  of  the  same
magnitude  but  exactly  reversed  between  1964  and  1968.  Finally,
farmers  appeared  to  be  less  concerned  about  government  costs when
interviewed  in  1968  than  when  interviewed  in  1964.
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Table  4  lists  farmers'  reactions  to  several  prominent  proposed
programs.  Solicitation  of responses  was  preceded  with  the  statement:
"The  following  programs  have  been  proposed  as  ways  to  deal  with
the  farm  problem.  If  the  programs  could  be  made  to  work,  would
you  approve  or  disapprove?"
Currently,  the  most  talked  about  alternative  to government  pro-
grams  is  an  organization  of farmers  themselves  to  control production
and  bargain  collectively  for  higher  farm  prices  and  incomes.  Only
53  percent  of  the  152  farmers  interviewed  approved  and  30  percent
disapproved  of  the  proposal.  This  was  a  considerably  lower  rate  of
approval  than  the  69  percent  who  approved  of  item  7,  essentially
the  current  program  for  feed  grains.
Item  2,  use  of  sealed  bids  to  divert  land  from  production,  has
been  suggested  by  economists  as  a  way  to  cut the cost  to  taxpayers
of  farm  programs.  Farmers  did  not  react  favorably  to  it.  Farmers
reacted  even  less  favorably  to  item  3,  government  purchase  of farms
to  be  converted  into  recreational  or grazing  purposes.
Another  proposal  is  that  the  government  reduce  wheat  and  feed
grain  production  by  purchasing  from  farmers  a  lease  on  the  rights
to  grow  these  crops.  This  lease  could  be  of  indefinite  duration,  with
provisions  for the  farmer  to  recontinue  cropping by  buying back  the
lease  at  its purchase  price  plus  interest.  This proposal  (item  4)  and
the  proposal  to  make  allotments  negotiable  (item  5)  received  a  cool
reception.
Farmers  indicated  reservations,  as  in  the  1964  survey,  concern-
ing  a  free  market.  Twenty-five  percent  of  them  approved  and  61
percent  disapproved  of the program.  These results  are  consistent  with
the  1964  survey.  In  1968,  farmers  showed  little  enthusiasm  for  re-
turning  to  the  mandatory  programs  of  pre-1964  years,  according  to
item  8.
In short,  the  recent  survey  of  Oklahoma  farmers  indicated  con-
siderable  satisfaction  with  the  current  type  of  programs.  The  only
other  "satisfactory"  program,  which  only  a  slim  majority  approved,
was  an organization  of farmers  themselves  to run programs.  A  recent
Farm Journal poll  showed  even  higher  percentages  approving  self-
help  bargaining  for  farmers.  Collective  bargaining  in  grains  appears
to  hold  few  economic  advantages  over  current  programs,  since  con-
sumers  are unlikely  to  tolerate  substantially  higher food  wheat prices,
and export  markets  will  be  lost  if prices  are  set  too  high.  Yet  there
are  strong  sociological  arguments  favoring  collective  bargaining.
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OR  DISAPPROVAL  OF  SELECTED  FARM  PROGRAMS,  BASED  ON  1968  SURVEY
1
Un-  Dis-
Program  Approve  decided  approve
1.  An  organization  of  farmers  themselves
(independent  of  the  government)  would
control  production  to  raise  farm  prices
and  incomes.
2.  A  farmer  would  submit  sealed  bids  to
the  ASCS showing  the  payment  required
for  him  to  divert  land  from  production.
The  ASCS  would  accept  those  bids  from
farmers  that  would  remove  the  most
production  per  dollar  spent  by  the  gov-
ernment.
3.  The government  would  buy  whole  farms
and combine  several  farms to be  used for
public  recreation  or  leased  for  grazing.
4.  The  government  would  lease  the  rights
to  grow wheat  crops  and  feed  grains  on
a  farm.  Then  this  farm  could  no  longer
grow  wheat  or  feed  grains  for  the  dura-
tion  of  the  lease.  The  owner  could  use
the land  for any other  purpose,  including
the  production  of  other  crops.
5.  Wheat  and  feed  grain  allotments  could
be  bought  and  sold  between  farmers,  so
that  allotments  would  eventually  reach
the  hands  of those  who  would  make  the
best  use  of  them.
6.  All  government  controls  and  price  sup-
ports  would be  terminated,  and  the  farm
economy  would  be  on  a  free  market.
7.  Wheat  and  feed  grains  would  be  under
a  voluntary  acreage  diversion  program.
Each  individual  farmer  would  be  free  to
decide  each  year  if  he  wants  to  receive
payments  to  divert  land  from  his  crop
allotment  and  be  eligible  for  price  sup-
ports.
8.  Wheat  and  feed  grains  would  be  subject
to mandatory  acreage controls of the type
used  for wheat  before  1964.  All  farmers
would  be  required  to comply  with  allot-
ments  if  approved  in  a  national  refer-
endum.
53  17  30
20  16  64
4 5  91
21  14  65
16  5  80
25  14  61
69  12  19
32  15  53
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'Preliminary  data  from  survey  of  152  Oklahoma  farmers,  some  interviewed  in
the  fall  of  1967.Our  recent  survey  of  Oklahoma  farmers  revealed  considerable
discontent.  A  term  to  describe  the  current  feelings  of  commercial
farmers  is  anomia. The  word  means  social  alienation,  a lack  of con-
fidence  in  one's environment.  This word  has  long  been  used to  char-
acterize  the  rural  poor,  but  this  attitude  is  growing  among  commer-
cial  farmers.  They  feel  they  individually  are  helpless  in the hands  of
big  government,  big business,  big labor,  and "big  nature."  They feel
they  are  slowly  being  squeezed  out  between  the  forces  that  mean
higher  costs  for  what  they buy  and  lower  prices  for  what  they  sell.
This so-called  cost-price  squeeze  and farm  discontent  are  not new-
what  is  different  is the  feeling  of pessimism, frustration,  fatalism,  and
helplessness  at  a  time  when  farmers  express  strong  approval  of  the
current  commodity  programs  and  when  farm  income  is  quite  high.
Discontent  is  accelerated  by  high  land  prices-substantial  monetary
benefits  of  farm  programs  have  gone  to  original  landowners,  leaving
the  new,  young,  heavily  indebted  farm  operator  highly  vulnerable  to
lower  commodity  prices.
The  backbone  of  the  grain  economy,  the  efficient  operator  of  a
500  acre  wheat  farm in  western  Oklahoma  or Kansas,  is  for the  first
time  feeling  the  economic  pinch.  A  farm  now  must  be  even  larger
to  be  highly  efficient,  and  comparatively  few  operators  will  be  able
to  achieve  an economic  unit.
The  best  way  to  overcome  the  discontent  of  grain  producers  is
to  increase  their  involvement  in  policy  and program  decisions.  Mar-
ket  power  is  now  "in"  with  several  farm  organizations  and  com-
modities,  including  fruits,  vegetables,  dairy  products,  and  broilers.
Collective  bargaining  has  distinct  limitations  for  grains,  but  perhaps
farmers  can  be  given  more  say  in  economic  decisions  than  in  the
past.  Bargaining  boards  could  overcome  anomia  in  two  important
ways-one  is  to  make  farmers  feel  they  have  a  voice  in  grain poli-
cies,  and  the second  is  to increase  the  economic  education of farmers.
It might be  well  to  explore  ways  to  aid  grain  farmers  to form  a large
self-help  bargaining  association  even  though  the  economic  benefits
are  illusory.
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
A major  change in  the direction  of government programs  of acre-
age  diversion  and  supply  control  could  be  caused  by  crises  in  the
world  food  supply-demand  balance  or  unfavorable  attitudes  toward
such  programs  by  farmers.  Projections  of  the  world  supply-demand
balance  indicate  that farmers  are  likely  to operate  within  the  context
of  excess  supplies  and  a  cost-price  squeeze  for some  time  in  the  fu-
142ture  in  the  absence  of  programs  to  control production  and  stabilize
the  farm economy.
These  stabilization  efforts  should  be  kept  in  perspective,  how-
ever.  The  analysis  in this  paper  shows why  problems  of low resource
returns  will  plague  the  majority  of  farmers  for  many  years,  until
farms  move  to  efficient  size  units  through  consolidation  and  other
means.  Capitalization  of program  benefits into  land values  is  of con-
tinuing  concern,  and  certainly  dampens  enthusiasm  among  econo-
mists  for  greater  transfer  payments  from  taxpayers  or  other  extra-
market,  "artificial"  means  to  raise  incomes  above current  levels.  But
while  farm  operators  would  receive  about  the  same  net  return  for
their  labor  and  management  in  the  long  run  without  government
programs,  the  adjustment  to lower  gross  farm receipts would be trau-
matic  indeed.  Some  form  of  economic  stabilization,  either  run  by
farmers  themselves  or by the  government,  is  likely  to  remain.  Prob-
lems  of high land values  inflated by  capitalized  program  benefits  and
low  returns  will  plague  farmers,  and  are  one  cause  of  current  dis-
content  especially  among  young  farmers.
The  reaction  of  farmers  to  some  proposed  alternative  programs
was  ascertained  in  a  recent  survey  of  152  farmers  in  commercial
farming  areas  of  western  Oklahoma.  The  results  showed  consider-
able  support  for  current  programs.  The  only  other  program  receiv-
ing significant approval  was  for an organization  of farmers  themselves
to  control  production  and  stabilize  the  farm  economy.  The  survey
revealed  considerable  discontent  among  farmers,  although  they  ap-
proved  of  current programs  and  their gross  incomes  are not low.  To
overcome  the  feelings  of  anomia,  it  is  suggested  that  ways  be  ex-
plored  to  help  farmers  obtain  greater  bargaining  power.  The  en-
deavor  could  produce  two  principal  products:  an  awareness  of  the
nature  of markets  which  they  face  and  an  involvement  in  economic
policy  decisions.
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